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Christoph Deutschmann
Paradoxes of Social Rise. 
The Expansion of Middle Classes and the Financial Crisis1
 
The article views the current financial crisis from the background of long term socio-economic changes in ad-
vanced industrial societies. Central points are the rise of middle classes, the accumulation of financial wealth 
in the upper strata of middle classes in combination with an increasing concentration of financial assets at the 
level of the top rich, and the advance of pension and investment funds as collective actors at financial markets. 
The paper analyses the interconnections between these developments in the framework of a multilevel model, 
culminating in the thesis of a collective “Buddenbrooks”-effect: a structural upward mobility of society will 
lead to an increasing imbalance at capital markets because a strongly rising volume of financial assets searching 
profitable investment opportunities will go parallel with a decline of the social reservoir of solvent entrepre-
neurial debtors. Therefore, advanced industrial economies are faced with chronic excess liquidity and export 
surpluses at capital markets, leading to the build-up of speculative bubbles and subsequent crashes. The author 
argues that the present crisis cannot be understood properly without taking account of these backgrounds.
I. Introduction1
At the end of 2009, the financial crisis was still far 
from over and the discussion on the causes of the cri-
sis continues. There is still much confusion about how 
all of this could happen. Apparently, the expertise of 
professional economics had largely failed, as the large 
majority of economists were unable to forecast the 
crisis and its dimension. The mainstream theory of 
“efficient financial markets” had even ruled out the 
possibility of such a collapse. Nevertheless, the pres-
ent discussion on the explanation of the crisis is still 
being dominated largely by the economic profession. 
In a broad overview, two lines of arguments can be 
distinguished: orthodox and heterodox.
The orthodox position could perhaps be sum-
marised by the keyword “human failure”. This posi-
tion attributes the main responsibility for the collapse 
of the international financial and capital markets to 
the actors, their “greed”, irresponsibility and incred-
ible carelessness. Mortgage credits had been granted 
at a large scale to debtors with no sufficient ability to 
pay. With the support of analysts and rating agencies, 
these credits were securitised and sold on the global 
market. Investment bank managers, driven by the 
prospect of astronomical bonuses, created and mar-
keted an ever increasing variety of largely intranspar-
ent financial “products”,. Further players in the game 
were the central bank authorities, who, for too long, 
kept up their policies of cheap money after the last 
crash in 2000/2001 and thus helped to create a new 
bubble (Taylor 2009). According to this widespread 
view, the problem does not lie in the system, but in 
the actors. If everybody had stuck to the rules, the 
collapse would not have happened. However, is it re-
ally possible to distinguish the “system” and the “ac-
1 A German version of this paper appeared under the title: “Die 
Finanzmärkte und die Mittelschichten: der kollektive Budden-
brooks-Effekt” in: Leviathan 2008, Vol. 36/4: 501-517
tors” in such a neat way – in a system actually made 
up of human actions? Would a realistic theory of fi-
nancial markets not have to take into account how 
the actors really are and not how they should be from 
the viewpoint of theory? And is it suffice to explain 
the persistence of low interest rates after 2001 (and 
likewise today) simply by “monetary excesses” by the 
Fed and other central banks, instead of considering 
the global excess liquidity on capital markets?2 
Compared with this orthodox common sense view, 
the heterodox positions surely are more realistic. Two 
well-known heterodox approaches are Minsky’s “fi-
nancial instability” concept (Minsky 1982) and Kindle-
berger’s and Aliber’s (2005) historical analysis of ma-
nias, panics and crashes which is closely related to 
Minsky’s work. According to these authors, financial 
crises are normal phenomena of capitalist develop-
ment. In their historical overview covering the period 
between 1618 and 1998, they count no less than 38 
such crises. Financial markets are different from other 
markets, as they are characterised by several particu-
lar mechanisms:
a.) On financial markets there is no built-in equilib-
rium mechanism. Rather, positive or negative disequi-
libria tend to reinforce themselves. A phase of “mania” 
may develop, if an exogenous incident gives rise to an 
optimistic mood among investors, inducing them to 
buy assets. As a consequence, the prices of the assets 
will rise, thereby motivating other investors to jump 
on board. The rise of prices will accelerate if some in-
vestors start to finance their purchases through credit, 
expecting that the increase of prices will exceed the 
interest rates which they have to pay. At some point, 
2 Taylor (2009, 6) rejects the excess liquidity thesis by pointing 
to IMF figures on the development of global saving and invest-
ment shares, showing a decline of the global saving rate. As 
empirical evidence this is clearly too thin (see the discussion of 
the development of financial assets below). 
Christoph Deutschmann Journal of Social Science Education 
Paradoxes of social rise – The expansion of middle classes and the financial crisis Volume 9, Number 1, 2010, pp. 20–31
21
however, the optimistic mood will decline, and some 
investors will start to sell their assets in order to re-
duce their liabilities. The upward movement of the 
market comes to a halt and turns in the opposite di-
rection, again reinforcing itself. The leverage effect of 
credit further accelerates the negative trend. Prices 
decline and bankruptcies increase, the crisis is fol-
lowed by panic and crash. In short, financial markets 
are inherently instable.
b.) The build-up and subsequent annihilation of 
assets in financial crises is often connected with con-
siderable redistribution effects between the investors. 
On the winning side we find the professional specu-
lators, the “insiders” who manage to buy and sell in 
time, although they can, of course, fail, too. The losers 
are the amateurs, the outsiders, who buy and sell late: 
“The outsider amateurs who buy high and sell low are 
the victims of the euphoria that affects them late in 
the day. After they lose, they go back to their normal 
occupations to save for another splurge five or ten 
years later” (Kindleberger, Aliber 2005, 40).
c.) A third peculiarity of financial markets is the in-
ability of actors to learn. Of course, everybody knows 
that crises can happen and, to be more precise, that 
they did happen in the past. However, during the 
build-up of a new mania the conviction prevails that 
this time everything is different: “The authorities rec-
ognize that something exceptional is happening in 
the economy and while they are mindful of earlier ma-
nias, ‘this time is different’, and they have extensive 
explanations for the difference” (Kindleberger, Aliber 
2005, 24).
All these mechanisms can clearly be recognised in 
the development of the current crisis. In so far, the 
financial instability hypothesis has, without a doubt, 
proven its empirical validity. From this one could con-
clude that the present crisis is nothing but a repeti-
tion of the well-established historical pattern of finan-
cial crises described by Minsky and Kindleberger and, 
Aliber. However, such an interpretation would not be 
sufficient, as I am going to argue in this paper. What it 
neglects is not only the unprecedented depth and the 
global dimension of the crisis. Moreover, what should 
not be overlooked are certain long-term structural 
changes of mature industrial societies which have led 
to an accumulation of tensions and imbalances on the 
capital markets, thus enhancing the disruptive poten-
tial of financial market bubbles – at least in compari-
son with the era of the Bretton Woods arrangement 
from the end of the Second World War to 1973. Since 
the 1970s, the growth rate of global private financial 
assets had been around three times as high as that of 
the social product in 23 highly developed OECD-coun-
tries, and the trade volume on markets for foreign ex-
change, stocks and loans grew five times as fast (Sas-
sen 2005, 19 f.). As a consequence, a latent or open 
mismatch has emerged between the growing volume 
of rent seeking financial assets on the one hand, and 
declining real investment opportunities on the other. 
After the burst of the New Economy bubble in 2001-
2003, this mismatch now seems to have manifested 
itself again at a much larger scale.
My aim is thus to look beyond the concrete mecha-
nisms of the actual crash and to analyse the long-term 
shifts of social class structures and financial asset dis-
tribution underlying the crisis. In the next section 
(II.) I will consider these trends in more detail. In the 
following section (III.) I will outline a macro-micro 
model of financial markets in order to clarify the in-
teractions between shifts in the social class structure 
and the distribution of financial assets on the one 
hand, and individual investor behaviour on the other. 
A rigorous empirical test of the model is not intended 
here. Nevertheless, I will try to demonstrate the plau-
sibility of the approach by using empirical data, refer-
ring mainly to the German case. A concluding discus-
sion will follow (IV.).
II. Long-term structural changes
Since the end of the Second World War, the mature in-
dustrial societies of Europe, North America and Japan 
experienced a period of lasting economic prosperity. 
At least during the first three decades after the War, 
the level of real mass income rose considerably, the 
middle classes grew in relation to absolutely and rela-
tively decreasing manual workers. The service sector 
expanded, and the level of mass education rose. These 
changes gave strong impulses to the development of 
financial markets and the penetration of society by 
the financial industry. Four trends appear particularly 
relevant from this point of view:
1. As already mentioned, the volume of private fi-
nancial assets showed a strong and continuous rise 
which by far surpassed the growth of national income. 
In West Germany, private financial assets increased 
around twice as much as the net national income be-
tween 1960 and 1990 (Stein 2004, 35); the same trend 
continued, albeit slightly diminished, in united Ger-
many between 1991 and 2004 (Deutsche Bundesbank 
2005, 28). In 2006, the gross volume of financial as-
sets in Germany amounted to 4.5 trillion Euros (net 
2.9 trillion), around twice the gross national product, 
and the wealth to be bequeathed has risen according-
ly (Szydlik 2004). Even in Germany, where the popu-
larity of holding stocks has always been low in inter-
national comparison, in a population of 82 million in 
2006, 10.3 million owned stocks and funds (Institut 
der deutschen Wirtschaft 2007, 66). Although there 
is still a remarkable wealth gap between East- and 
West Germany, East German proprietors are gradually 
catching up (Hauser 2009). With the rising value of 
financial assets, the stream of capital incomes (inter-
est payments, dividends) flowing to the owners in-
creased steadily, the estimated annual volume of capi-
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tal incomes amounting to at least 300 billion Euros 
in Germany before the crisis. According to the World 
Wealth Report published annually by Capgemini and 
Merrill Lynch, there were 3.1 million “High Net Worth 
Individuals” (HNWIs = net ownership of financial as-
sets of more than 1 million US Dollars) in Europe and 
10.1 million in the world in 2007 with an aggregate 
capital of 40.7 trillion dollars; at the global level the 
number of HNWIs doubled between 1997 and 2007 
(Lauterbach, Ströing 2009, 18). While there is a lively 
public debate on the level of taxes, social security con-
tributions, wages, salaries and manager bonuses, the 
legitimacy of effortless capital incomes seems to be 
beyond any discussion – in spite of the increasing cost 
burden they create for the real economy.
2. As it is well known, ownership of financial assets 
is distributed very unevenly, the bulk of capital falling 
to the top 1 to 5 percent of the wealthiest; moreover, 
the concentration of financial wealth has increased 
since the 1990s. Nevertheless, even the upper middle 
classes (top three deciles of the income distribution) 
were able to accumulate considerable fortunes, as ta-
ble 1 for Germany shows.
Table 1:  Distribution of Private Financial 
Assets in Germany 1993-2003 
Billions of € (v.H.)
Deciles 1993 1998 2003
1 -2.1 (-0.2) -3.9 (-0.3) -7.9 (-0.6)
2 2.4 (0.2) 1.3 (0.1) 0.8 (0.1)
3 6.3 (0.6) 5.9 (0.5) 6.1 (0.5)
4 12.5 (1.2) 13.4 (1.2) 16.2 (1.2)
5 23.9 (2.3) 27.3 (2.4) 34.9 (2.6)
6 50.7 (4.8) 58.5 (5.1) 70.5 (5.3)
7 105.7 (10.0) 112.1 (9.9) 123.6 (9.3)
8 160.3 (15.1) 171.2 (15.1) 190.0 (14.2)
9 227.3 (21.4) 247.0 (21.7) 275.8 (20.7)
10 474.7 (44.7) 504.3(44.4) 624.4 (46.8)
Source: 2. Armuts- und Reichtumsbericht der Bundesregierung 
(Federal Report on Poverty and Wealth); Lebenslagen in Deutsch-
land 2005. Note: The figures are based on the “Einkommens- und 
Verbrauchsstichprobe” of the Statistisches Bundesamt (Federal Of-
fice of Statistics), which does not include very large incomes and 
fortunes. For this reason, they differ from the above mentioned 
figures of the “Deutsche Bundesbank”.
Even in the 19th century the middle classes – Kindle-
berger and Aliber mention “spinsters, widows, retired 
naval and army officers, magistrates, retired mer-
chants, parsons and orphanages” (Kindleberger, Aliber 
2005, 268) as the typical clientele – actively engaged 
in financial speculation. However, the layer of middle 
class financial rentiers has meanwhile grown consid-
erably. Likewise, the corresponding social interests 
seem to have become much more influential. Invest-
ing money in stocks, private and public bonds has be-
come a mass phenomenon, as it becomes evident in 
the daily TV-news. The social profile of the investors 
is characterised by a preponderance of higher educa-
tion and academic qualifications, a concentration on 
self-employed, professional, clerical and managerial 
occupations, a relative dominance of the male sex, of 
pensioners and higher age groups (Lebenslagen in 
Deutschland 2005, Tarvenkorn, Lauterbach 2009). In 
some of these aspects, the profile is remarkably differ-
ent between European countries (de Bondt 2005). We 
encounter a social milieu that is very diverse, stretch-
ing from gamblers and social climbers on the one hand, 
to wealthy and saturated pensioners on the other. 
3.) The increasing volume of financial assets and 
number of investors induced a strong expansion of 
the market demand for financial services. As a result, 
“institutional investors” (pension funds, hedge and 
investment funds) emerged on the financial market, 
first in the USA, later in Europe and other parts of the 
world. The term “institutional investors” is mislead-
ing in so far, as these firms do not invest their capital 
in real production. Rather, their business is a purely 
financial one and concentrates on the management 
of their customer’s assets. In contrast to commercial 
banks, they do not depend on the credit business, 
but collect the capital of their customers and invest 
it in stocks, private and public bonds and other secu-
rities. What remains to the normal customer is only 
the choice between alternative package offers, dif-
fering along yield and risk. The volume of capital col-
lected by the institutional investors around the world 
showed a spectacular increase since the 1990s; today 
it surpasses the volume of the GNP in some countries 
(OECD 2005). Institutional investors no longer confine 
their engagement to the stock markets, but have ex-
tended their business to the acquisition of small and 
middle sized firms (“Private equity”) and to markets 
for raw materials and foreign exchange. 
4.) The rise of the institutional investors would 
have been unthinkable without the globalisation of 
capital and financial markets after the collapse of the 
Bretton Woods-System after 1973, and the subsequent 
deregulation and liberalisation of the markets, which 
had been promoted in Europe mainly by the treaty of 
Maastricht. A further decisive factor was the spread 
of modern information technologies and the “digitali-
sation” of markets, which allowed a quantum leap in 
the volume and speed of transactions, and provided 
the technical basis for the emergence of a new global 
social space (Knorr-Cetina 2005). All this meant a spec-
tacular enlargement of investment options for the 
financial industry. A global “market for corporate con-
trol” (Windolf 1994) emerged, and, moreover, markets 
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for derivates and other secondary financial products 
developed. On these markets, the funds could move 
like fish in water, or, to be more precise, like pikes in 
a fish-pond: with the elimination of national capital 
market controls and the expansion of investment op-
tions, the opportunities for fraud and corruption like-
wise increased (Windolf 2005; Blomert 2005).
III.  Financial markets and shifts of social 
class structure: A macro-micro-model
The changes outlined above are meeting increasing-
ly critical comments in the public. Some observers 
warn that the rising power of institutional investors, 
cooperating with an influential consulting industry, 
may undermine the institutions of political democ-
racy. Catchwords like “economic terror” are circulat-
ing in the media, the hedge funds are denounced as 
“locusts”, and the financial crises have evoked “fears 
of falling” among the middle classes. Corrupt ana-
lysts, fraudulent bankers and analysts are denounced 
by politicians and the media, and many of the crash 
victims go to court in order to claim their apparent 
“right”, like in the Lehman case.
There can be no doubt that fraud, deceitful prac-
tices and corruption are widespread phenomena on 
financial markets and that the existing regulatory 
structures and mechanisms give much room for such 
practices. Nevertheless, I cannot deny a certain un-
easiness: do the investors, now claiming to be “vic-
tims”, really deserve so much compassion? Without 
the often naive quest of millions of small investors 
for maximum profits the business of the investment 
funds, even their existence, would not have been pos-
sible. Without doubt, fund managers are no altruists, 
and the complaints about their greed are everything 
else but unjustified. However, who stimulated the 
competition between the funds, driving them into 
riskier and riskier operations? It seems that the “ter-
ror” of the economy, so vividly complained about in 
certain middle class milieus, goes back to a consider-
able degree to the well-developed financial instincts 
of the very middle class individuals themselves. In 
other words, it is not far-fetched to assume that the 
often complained negative phenomena of financial 
capitalism may be interpreted partly as the unintend-
ed collective result of individual investor action. Here 
we meet a constellation that appears to be a case for 
genuine sociological analysis, if we understand soci-
ology as the inquiry of unintended collective conse-
quences of individual action. Sociological explana-
tions can contribute to clarifying the situation by 
carefully distinguishing between collective structures, 
their impact on individual actions and the aggregate 
effects of individual actions. A sociological explana-
tion according to the well-established concepts of 
Coleman, Lindenberg and Esser is not yet a theory, 
but rather a kind of instruction how to build theories. 
Its worth depends on the use one makes of it. Here, 
I will try making use of the concept of sociological 
explanation by applying it to the actual processes on 
the financial markets.
A sociological explanation consists, as I will de-
scribe here only briefly, basically of three steps (Esser 
1993, 1999): First, a reconstruction of the social situa-
tion of the actors (“logic of situation” according to 
Esser); second, a theoretically based explanation of 
individual action in the given situation (“logic of se-
lection”); third, a deduction of the newly constituted 
collective situation from the aggregated effects of in-
dividual actions (“logic of aggregation”). How could 
an analysis of the development on the financial mar-
kets, which follows these three steps, look like? What I 
can offer in the following can obviously only be a very 
rough outline. The question I want to answer is: What 
are the collective consequences if a large number of 
individuals in a capitalist society succeed in moving 
socially upward, if they become wealthy and then 
invest their wealth in collective funds? Thus, in the 
first step we will have to deal with the social situation 
of the investors, with their objective social condition 
and their perception (“framing”) of that condition. In 
the second step we will concentrate on the action pro-
cess itself and on the motives and aims of the actors: 
why do they – for example – invest their money in 
securities, instead of real estate, or expanding their 
consumption? Finally, we will consider the question 
of the collective consequences: How will the structure 
of capital markets change, if the number of rentiers 
in a given population and the volume of their assets 
increase in absolute and relative terms? And what are 
the collective consequences, if the investors delegate 
the management of their assets to investment funds? 
1. Logic of the situation
Some aspects of the objective situation of the inves-
tors have already been dealt with above, and I will 
not discuss this point extensively. The large majority 
of the investors belong to the privileged and socially 
successful. They earn superior or top incomes, many 
are academically qualified and have higher adminis-
trative, managerial, professional jobs, or are self-em-
ployed. However, many of them did not come from 
privileged origins but had to make their way up by 
their own. They succeeded in climbing to occupation-
al and social positions often far superior to those of 
their parents. We should keep in mind that the social 
structure of Western Germany – albeit so far hardly 
Eastern Germany – is characterised by a strong trend 
towards intergenerational upward mobility. Accord-
ing to the figures of “Datenreport 2006” (Statistisches 
Bundesamt 2006, 603), even in the period 1991-2000 
one descent of Western German men in the occupa-
tional status hierarchy fell to 2.4 social rises; in the 
period 2001-2004, the corresponding figure declined 
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to 1.9. On the contrary, Western German women 
showed a positive balance of intergenerational social 
rises only since 1991 (1.3); the corresponding figure 
mounting to 1.9 in 2000-2004. Without this positive 
balance in intergenerational upward social mobility, it 
would hardly be possible to explain the high growth 
of private financial assets which, as already men-
tioned above, is mainly a Western German phenom-
enon, too. I am focussing here on intergenerational 
mobility, not on career mobility, where the situation 
nowadays has become different (more on this below). 
Social rises are reflected in above average increases 
of individual incomes. Social climbers receive an ad-
ditional income bonus which they tend to interpret as 
a reward for their efforts. 
We have arrived at the perception of the situation 
by the actors, and here we face a phenomenon which 
has been previously analysed by Georg Simmel (1989), 
and more recently in psychological studies on the 
use of money (for an overview, Haubl 2002). Money 
does not only “indicate” the social position of an in-
dividual, but constitutes it, as it embodies a universal 
private property right on social wealth. Simmel uses 
the German word “Vermoegen” which is normally 
translated as “asset” or “fortune”; the literal meaning, 
however, is “being able to”. The owner of money is 
socially influential not due to his/her social reputa-
tion or ranking, but commands a private potential of 
generalised power which apparently works in a direct 
way without any intervention of society. The power 
embodied in money tempts the owner to forget the 
difference between his/her – more or less limited – 
personal capacities and the potential of money. As a 
consequence, money can become the vehicle for an 
egocentric self-aggrandisement of the owner, follow-
ing the motto: what my money “can”, I can and I am. 
The owner experiences his assets as a natural enlarge-
ment of his ego. This is the reason why he must feel 
attacked in his personal integrity if he is required to 
pay taxes, or if the stock market crashes. Social climb-
ers seem to have a strong affinity to such types of self-
enactment, as they tend to view their money as “hard 
earned by my own efforts”.
2. Logic of selection
We now proceed to the second step: how will indi-
viduals act after becoming wealthy, what objectives 
and criteria will they follow in their decisions? From 
a purely theoretical viewpoint, one could assume that 
some will simply feel saturated after having reached 
a certain income level. They may donate surpluses 
for charitable purposes, saving only an emergency 
reserve for themselves and spending it later. However, 
such a hypothesis does not appear very plausible, al-
though it may apply to certain special cases: Andrew 
Carnegie, for example, was extremely rich. Neverthe-
less, he felt obliged not to consume or to bequeath his 
wealth, but to return it to society via his foundations 
(Nasaw 2006). A more realistic assumption is that the 
wealthy will invest their money in a way that supports 
their further social rise. Status oriented symbolic con-
sumption can be interpreted as a case of such a career-
related investment of money: by buying a Mercedes or 
a prestigious Swiss clock I can signalise and anticipate 
my affiliation to higher social circles whom I am striv-
ing to without actually belonging to them yet. 
However, our focus here is on the motives of invest-
ing money in securities and other financial assets. At 
this point, the instructions of Esser and Coleman sug-
gest the introduction of a nomological hypothesis to 
explain individual action. However, no such hypoth-
esis is within sight. Sociological research on consump-
tion has delivered an impressive variety of findings on 
individual lifestyles and their dependence on socio-bi-
ographic conditions, milieu affiliations and personal 
capital endowment. The issue of money and invest-
ment of money, however, continued to be largely ig-
nored. Like neoclassic economists, sociologists seem 
to consider money as “insignificant”. The behaviour 
of investors received more attention from the side 
of psychology and behavioural finance (Fischer et al. 
1999). However, the focus here is on relatively narrow 
issues like herd instincts or the choice between risky 
and conservative styles of investment and, first and 
foremost, it is not sociological but psychological. 
One of the few recent sociological studies is the 
research report of Birenheide, Legnaro, Fischer (2005) 
which is based on qualitative interviews with 37 small 
stockholders in 2002. The results of this study allow 
to formulate some more specific hypotheses. One of 
the findings of the authors was that the saving behav-
iour of the interviewed did no longer conform to the 
classic “deferred gratification pattern”. “Not saving as 
such has disappeared, but its primary significance for 
future consumption does no longer hold. Instead, a si-
multaneous presence of credit based consumption on 
the one hand, and speculatively oriented accumula-
tion of financial resources on the other, are prevailing” 
(Birenheide et al. 2005, 31, translation C.D.). Financial 
investment and consumption are not considered to 
be alternatives, but complement one another. The 
motives for financial investment are closely related to 
societal processes of individualisation. The investors 
view themselves as “responsible” actors, disciplined 
just by their conformity to social values of individual 
autonomy and self-responsibility. On the one hand, 
this may lead to excessive control illusions, as the in-
vestors tend to view the performance of their stocks 
as the immediate outcome of their personal compe-
tence. On the other hand, a kind of frenzy may occur, 
where the ego of the investor loses all contact with 
reality and experiences itself as almighty. The first 
impulse to enter the business is often exhortations 
of friends or relatives not to “leave your money idle”, 
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or “secret tips” of trustworthy persons. Advertising 
actions, such as the campaign for “Telecom-people 
stocks”, suggest undreamt-of prospects of profit, leav-
ing behind all chances of normal gainful occupation. 
After having entered the game, moods like “greed” or 
“fever” emerge: “The result is a kind of “faustian pact” 
between an anomic self, determined to transgress all 
boundaries, and a rational ego, which remembers the 
risks and calculates long-term horizons” (Birenheide 
at al. 2005, 96, translation C.D.). Even long after the 
share prices started falling, the investor feels deter-
mined to keep the shares (which he had decided to bet 
on) for reasons of self-respect, often with the result of 
big losses. The investor faces the problem that his/her 
calculating ego mixes with the object of his calcula-
tions – money – in a diffuse way. There seem to be 
no more relevant social concerns for him/her except 
profit and the prospect of more profits.
Just because of its character as a “general means” 
– this having been already Simmel’s (1989) central in-
sight – money rises above its status as a means and 
becomes and end in itself which determines individu-
al action in a voluntary or involuntary way. To clarify 
how this transgression of boundaries is reflected in 
individual practice – whether in the forms of avarice, 
greed or frenzy – and which social and biographic fac-
tors are relevant to explain these diverse forms surely 
needs further research. So far we can safely conclude 
that Coleman’s hypothesis of rational choice and util-
ity maximisation does not appear overly helpful in 
explaining individual investor action.
3. Logic of aggregation
We now approach the third step in the logic of socio-
logical explanation: What are the macro-structural 
consequences for societies and capital markets, if 
large numbers of individuals succeed in moving so-
cially upward and invest their newly acquired finan-
cial wealth in the capital market? The question can 
be divided into two sub-questions: first, the question 
regarding the macro-structural consequences of social 
rise (3a.); second, the question of what will happen if 
masses of individual investors delegate their invest-
ment decisions to new types of collective actors, the 
capital funds (3b). 
3a.) Individual investors are normally not concerned 
about the problem of the collective preconditions and 
consequences of their own actions. Many believe that 
they have something like a “natural right” on a yield 
of their assets. If losses occur instead of the expected 
profits, everybody feels surprised and betrayed, and 
some go to court in order to pursue their claims. One 
does not think much about where the profit actually 
comes from or relies upon the expertise of trustwor-
thy advisors or friends. The profit seems to flow from 
the portfolio like the current from the outlet. Money 
itself appears to “work” for the investor. 
Against such popular views, a simple truth should 
be kept in mind: Financial assets are always based on 
contracts between debtors and creditors. The value of 
assets always depends on the availability of debtors 
being able and willing to borrow the capital and to 
repay it with interest. Debts must be redeemed, the 
money must flow back, and this can, in the final in-
stance, be ensured only by work: either directly by the 
work of the debtor who has to earn and repay the cred-
it granted to him by a bank, or indirectly by employees, 
whose work supports the profitability of the capital of 
the entrepreneur and enables the latter likewise to re-
deem the credit which he may have taken, or keeps the 
price of the company stocks high. Thus, the financial 
system is always – as indirectly as ever – coupled with 
the real economy, in spite of all speculative excesses. 
Entrepreneurs in a dynamic capitalist economy, who 
plan to realise a profit on their capital by selling their 
products, always depend on a level of demand higher 
than the one they created themselves before by their 
own cost payments. Economic growth is possible only 
under the assumption of a permanent inflow of addi-
tional demand into the system which must come from 
the outside and needs to be financed by the creation 
of credit in the banking system (Binswanger 1996). 
“Openness and optimism towards the future” – what 
first appears as a mere ideological topic in the pub-
lic rhetoric on economic growth points in fact to a 
strong imperative: private households and capitalist 
firms must be prepared to incur debts and to spend 
more money than they receive in order to keep the 
capitalist growth machine running. Without continu-
ous incurrence of new debts and without the corre-
sponding future oriented habits of work and lifestyles, 
capitalist growth would be impossible and the system 
would head into a permanent crisis. The inclination to 
incur debts will – as a rule – be high where the large 
majority of the population is still living under poor 
material conditions but aspires to move socially up-
ward and to become wealthy. An ideal capital market 
might be conceptualised as a social pyramid with few 
rich proprietors at the top and a large, poor, juvenile, 
but at the same time, socially aspiring population 
at the basis. The prospect of social rise and financial 
wealth motivates an extraordinary work performance 
among those without property. The efforts of the 
poor, in turn, ensure a high demand for capital and 
the profitability of capital owned by the rich.  
This game may work under several conditions 
which cannot be brought in line with each other eas-
ily. One the one hand, the existence of marked social 
inequality, of a class dichotomy between a small elite 
of capital owners and a large propertyless majority 
is required. Without this dichotomy there would be 
no tension and without tension there would be no 
dynamics. On the other hand, the class dichotomy 
should not be socially (i.e., ethnically or corporatively) 
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closed. The propertyless must see a sufficient chance 
for themselves to get rewarded for their efforts, to 
individually move upward and to cross the class di-
chotomy, although the objective chance for success 
may be tiny and hardly higher than in a lottery. Third, 
however, not too many people should be successful in 
rising socially. To render this clear, one has to simply 
imagine the extreme case of all propertyless satisfy-
ing their aspirations and moving to the top. The result 
would be a reversed pyramid structure consisting en-
tirely of capital rentiers with no net debtors redeem-
ing the claims. Of course, such a constellation – which 
I propose to call the “Collective Buddenbrooks-Effect” 
(according to the famous novel by Thomas Mann) – 
would be untenable, as it would mean the immediate 
annihilation of all financial assets.
If we now go back to the above mentioned figures 
on collective upward mobility in Western Germany in 
order to consider the collective consequences of that 
mobility, the finding is clear: although German soci-
ety is still far from the final stage of the collective 
Buddenbrooks-effect, it has nevertheless already cov-
ered a considerable distance toward that stage. The 
collective consequence of large scale social rises is 
a structural upward mobility of society. The middle 
and upper classes of society become larger, the lower 
classes smaller. Table 2 gives an overview over the 
amount of intergenerational upward mobility in West-
ern German society during the last decades of the 20th 
century; only men (fathers and sons) are considered. 
Table 2:  Intergenerational Mobility in 
Western Germany (2000) 
Percentages of adult male working 
population, N = 3.650
Social status Fathers Sons 
1.  Entrepreneurs  
(10 employees and more)
 0.8  0.4
2. Professionals  1.8  3.1
3.  Higher Service Occupations 10.1 22.2
4.  Middle Service Occupations  8.4 25.5
5.  Lower Service Occupations 14.5  3.0
6.  Self Employed  
(less than 10 employees)
 6.9  7.5
7. Farmers  4.6  3.1
8.  Highly Skilled Manual Workers  4.6  3.1
9. Skilled Manual Workers 30.9 18.6
10.  Semi- and Unskilled  
Manual Workers
17.4 15.5
Source: Geißler (2006: 260), based on SOEP
Table 2 compares the occupational status of Western 
German men in 2000 with that of their fathers. The 
four upper layers of the occupational hierarchy made 
up 21.1 percent of the father generation, it increased 
to 51.2 percent in the generation of the sons. The bulk 
of this increase fell on the higher and middle service 
occupations, whereas the layer of the professionals 
grew more moderately. The layer of entrepreneurs 
even showed a decline. The share of manual workers 
(high, medium and semi/unskilled) fell from 52.9 per-
cent in the generation of fathers to 37.2 percent in the 
generation of sons; a spectacular decrease can also be 
observed in the lower service occupations. 
If we interpret these figures from the viewpoint of 
capital markets, a first general statement can be made: 
the wealthier middle and upper layers of society have 
grown considerably. The descendants of these layers 
no longer have a stringent motive to move further up-
ward. Many enjoy the additional income flowing from 
their capital and some may cultivate their hedonistic 
lifestyles. With the expansion of these well-situated 
classes and the rise of their wealth, the volume of pri-
vate capital seeking profitable investment opportuni-
ties on the financial markets is likely to have grown 
as well. Conversely, the lower layers, being endowed 
with only little or no assets, have shrunk in relative 
and absolute terms. With them, the social reservoir for 
upward mobile, “entrepreneurially” oriented debtors 
has decreased. It is this shift alone, which may give 
rise to an imbalance on the capital markets. The pos-
sibility of such an imbalance, however, is supported 
by two additional factors: mounting blockades of up-
ward career mobility and the ageing of the popula-
tion. 
In order to focus on the first factor, further analysis 
of the shifts of social structure is needed. If a large 
number of individuals in a cohort succeed in moving 
socially upward, what are the consequences for the fol-
lowing cohorts and generations? Do their chances im-
prove or do they deteriorate? Recent research findings 
on social mobility and on the labour market conditions 
of the young generation seem to confirm the second 
hypothesis. In their international studies on the im-
pact of globalisation on the life courses and employ-
ment chances of the young generation (“GLOBALIFE”-
study), Hans-Peter Blossfeld and his collaborators 
concluded that young adults, and especially those 
with low qualifications and little social and financial 
resources, are the losers of the globalisation process. 
Since the end of the 20th century, their labour market 
situation has deteriorated markedly. They are exposed 
to high insecurity and burdened by precarious and 
flexible employment contracts without command-
ing resources to buffer the risks (Blossfeld et al. 2005, 
2007). However, the phenomena observed by Blossfeld 
et al. may be attributed not only to the economic con-
sequences of globalisation, but may also be explained 
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as an after-effect of structural upward mobility of for-
mer cohorts and generations. On the one hand, the 
offspring of the social climbers are in a privileged po-
sition. They grow up in a warmly stuffed nest and do 
not need to fight for their rise and success. Economic 
and also – as it is well known – educational assets are 
being passed on from one generation to another. This 
guarantees a wide margin for the descendants of the 
well-situated, leaving hardly a chance for the others 
to catch up. With so many qualified positions already 
blocked by the privileged, it has become difficult for 
young men and women from the lower classes to en-
ter occupational careers and to find access to quali-
fied positions on the labour market. In Germany, the 
chances of lowly qualified youths (migrants as well as 
ethnic Germans) seem to have deteriorated to such a 
degree that many of them seem to have completely 
abandoned the hope for social rise (Neugebauer 2007). 
A vicious circle between the objective deterioration 
of social chances and individual resignation has devel-
oped, which is being discussed under the keyword “so-
cial exclusion” (Kronauer 2002; Byrne 2005; Bude 2008; 
Stichweh and Windolf 2009). Of course, in order to ex-
plain these phenomena, further factors need to be tak-
en into account, such as ethnic segregation, disorgani-
sation of families, conservatism and social selectivity 
of the educational system. I do not intend to discuss 
these issues in more detail, since my point here is only 
their relevance for the development of the capital and 
financial markets. It is not only the relative decrease 
of the social reservoir of promising entrepreneurial 
debtors, which gives rise to imbalances on the capital 
market, as I have argued above. These imbalances are 
reinforced by mounting barriers for upward social mo-
bility and the corresponding discouragement of the 
advancement motive. 
The other reinforcing factor is the ageing of the 
population. The motive for social advancement and 
entrepreneurial success tends to be strong in the ju-
venile stages of the individual life cycle, and tends 
to weaken in the more mature phases. The habitual 
orientation to the future which, as noted above, is 
such an important cultural precondition for capital-
ist growth, is the privilege of the young. With chroni-
cally low birth rates and the foreseeable ageing of the 
population, the economically active part of the popu-
lation will diminish, as will the cultural orientation 
to the future. At the same time, the layer of wealthy 
pensioners will increase. Demographic change, thus, 
is a further factor that reinforces the social preponder-
ance of capital rentiers over entrepreneurs.  
On this background, nobody should be surprised 
that the mature industrial societies in Western Europe, 
North America and Japan are increasingly faced with 
the problem of chronic excess liquidity on capital 
markets. As profitable investment outlets are lacking 
in the domestic economy, the capital flows into the 
international markets. The investors try to find the 
debtors elsewhere. Until the crash in 2008, a large 
part of the capital, nevertheless, flowed to the United 
States, due to the political reputation of the dollar as 
an international reserve currency and a “safe haven”. 
This helped the United States to finance their double 
deficit of international trade and public expenditures, 
and created a big bubble which eventually burst. Ad-
mittedly, countries like China, Russia, India, Brazil 
and other emerging economies have become increas-
ingly attractive for investors during the last years. Al-
though the demand for capital is still high in some of 
these countries, the political risks are, too. The crisis 
has shown that the globalisation of financial markets 
did not really provide a solution for the problem of 
chronic excess liquidity of capital, but actually has 
exacerbated it. The structural changes I described – 
structural upward mobility of societies, over-propor-
tional growth of financial assets – could be observed 
more or less in all developed industrial countries dur-
ing the last decades of the 20th century, and today in 
their beginnings also in China.
The global character of the crisis indicates that 
the excess liquidity of capital has indeed become a 
global problem. The financial industry reacted to the 
dilemma of lacking real investment opportunities by 
inventing artificial ones, and by pressing these deriva-
tive and speculative creations into the market. Howev-
er, it is evident that this could not provide a solution 
for the underlying problem and could not prevent the 
final burst of the bubble. These are the contradictions 
which have led to the actual crisis. They cannot only 
be observed today, but have already been accumulat-
ing for a considerable time; the burst of the Dotcom-
bubble in 2001 goes back to the same reasons. The 
Dotcom-crisis had triggered a period of feeble eco-
nomic growth especially in Germany (between 2001 
and 2005) which resulted in chronically high unem-
ployment. The permanent net-outflow of capital had 
a depressive effect on the economy, leading to reduc-
tions of employment and a down-up-redistribution of 
incomes. As a consequence of the strong decrease of 
regular jobs in the German economy during the pe-
riod 2001-2005, the middle class did no longer grow 
but shrunk, as many individuals became unemployed 
or had to accept a degradation of their terms of em-
ployment (Grabka and Frick 2008). These problems 
will become even more acute, if the US will no longer 
take their former role as a global debtor and promoter 
of growth in the future. 
3b. Contrary to the common economic rhetoric, fi-
nancial capital has ceased to be “scarce” since a long 
time, as I have emphasised. With the mounting over-
flow of capital, the claim of capital proprietors on a 
“yield” has actually lost its objective foundation. John 
Maynard Keynes noted this already seventy years ago 
and came to the conclusion that a “euthanasia of the 
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rentier” (Keynes 1973, 376) would be desirable. As ev-
erybody knows, this did not happen. On the contrary, 
by entrusting their money to institutional investors 
and capital funds, the individual investors grew a new 
type of collective actors, who are committed to serve 
their customers, the rentiers (and, not least, the fund 
managers themselves), and to promote their interests 
throughout society.
The funds are influencing the political system in a 
manifold, indirect and direct way. Due to the sheer 
volume of the assets controlled by them – as already 
noted, it comes close to or surpasses the national 
product in some countries – the funds create facts by 
their decisions that cannot be ignored by any govern-
ment. The consequences are felt in the arenas of tax, 
fiscal and monetary policies. By their exit threat, the 
funds managed to trigger a downward race of nation-
al governments in the field of taxes and social security 
contributions, particularly in Europe and, after the 
enlargement of the EU, in the East. Corporate taxes 
are showing a declining trend throughout the OECD-
countries during the last 20 years (Ganssmann 2004; 
OECD 2005). Apart from these indirect effects, there 
are also many direct interventions of the funds in the 
political system, being put forward by an armada of 
consultants, lobbyists and professors, who often are 
under contract to the funds. These advisors pretend 
to deliver allegedly absent “economic expertise” to 
the governments (Rügemer 2004). They do their best 
to promote political decisions in favour of the funds, 
such as the abolition of the tax on sales of corporate 
shares under the red-green government in Germany in 
2002. And, of course, they promote never ending cam-
paigns in the public media on the economic necessity 
and inevitability of lowering taxes, cutting social ex-
penditures, etc.
Beyond the political system and the public sphere, 
the influence of the funds is felt on the level of firms 
and management. Firms that are under control of 
the funds have to meet the profit targets agreed 
upon, otherwise they risk to be sold or closed. This 
is the main reason underlying the often cited “short-
termism” of management strategies, resulting in a ne-
glect of investments in innovative projects or in the 
substance of the firm which do not promise immedi-
ate profits. Profits are no longer defined as “residual 
income” according to conventional management text-
books. Rather, they are now taking on the character 
of a new type of “contractual income” according to 
the objectives agreed upon between the management 
and the owners. Conversely, wages and salaries are 
no longer “contractual incomes”; individual and col-
lective bargaining agreements are no longer consid-
ered to be binding. The employees receive what is left 
after the owners have satisfied their claims. Capital 
market oriented governance aims at uncoupling profit 
from risk and transforming it into a calculable quan-
tity. Even research and development departments are 
becoming “economised”, as research engineers are 
required to comply with time and cost targets and 
to design their projects in close conformity with the 
requirements of the market and of the manufacturing 
process, thereby losing the necessary minimum of 
functional autonomy (Grewer et al. 2007). 
However, if firms lose their capacity to innovate, 
while at the same time being required to distribute 
even more dividends to the shareholders, this means 
that profits will have to be financed by cuts in em-
ployment, wages, taxes, or in the capital substance 
of the firm. In this case, profits no longer come from 
successfully marketed innovations, allowing the firm 
and the economy to grow (Schumpeter’s “creative de-
struction”), but from redistributing a given revenue 
in favour of the shareholders. The production of prof-
its ceases to be a positive sum game, giving all stake-
holders of the firm the chance to gain. It turns into a 
zero-sum game in favour of the shareholders, the em-
ployees, the state and the community being the los-
ers. This is detrimental not only to economic growth, 
but also to the capacity of the economy to subsidise 
the non-economic subsystems of society – the insti-
tutions of science, education, health, art and culture 
– by taxes and transfer payments. As a consequence, 
these institutions become “economised”, as they are 
forced either to close or to raise the funds they need 
by themselves. If possible, they may be privatised 
and transformed into an outlet for always drifting, 
profit seeking capital. In so far, the “economisation” 
of the institutions of education, science and health, 
which Schimank and Volkmann (2008) have analysed 
in their studies, can be interpreted as a result of the 
replacement of the entrepreneur by the rentier in the 
economy. Contrary to the common rhetoric, financial 
market capitalism did not promote the entrepreneur-
ial forces in society. Rather, the rentiers seem to have 
erected a regime of domination over the entrepre-
neurs, paralysing the real growth of the economy, in-
flating speculative bubbles and turning firms, commu-
nities and states into victims of the financial industry. 
IV. Concluding discussion
My conclusion is that we are facing a complex of high-
ly self-contradictory actions, not only of the small 
elite of the extremely rich, but also of the large num-
ber of middle class investors. The investors believe in 
their “natural right” to gain. They commit themselves 
to the egocentric illusion of absolute wealth, while 
they are, in fact, undermining the conditions for the 
creation of real wealth by their actual practice and 
the collective consequences of this practice. Present 
day financial market capitalism has uncoupled prop-
erty rights and entrepreneurial responsibility to a 
historically unprecedented degree. Millions of middle 
class shareholders are expecting “yields” on their as-
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sets, without wasting any thought on the question 
of where the required debtors could come from, and 
without taking any entrepreneurial risk by them-
selves. One prefers preaching the sermon of the entre-
preneurial virtues to others, and one refuses to accept 
that there can be no profit where there is no entre-
preneurial innovation and creative destruction. With 
excessively growing financial assets, correspondingly 
more hard working debtors would be required. How-
ever, such a scenario is far from any reality, although 
the consulting industry is doing its best to propagate 
and popularise it. Real societies first have to ensure 
their reproduction and continuity, for example by 
raising and educating children, by caring for the el-
derly and disabled, by maintaining the social and cul-
tural infrastructure of society – activities which, even 
today, continue to be mostly unpaid or not profitable. 
Even if a considerable number of people may engage 
in entrepreneurial careers, society cannot devote its 
entire energy to the business of creative destruction 
simply to comply with the claims of the shareholders. 
Today, we face an escalation of these basic contradic-
tions. The problem of capitalism underlying the pres-
ent crisis lies in its own success. Capitalism has often 
proved to be successful in mobilising individual entre-
preneurial energies by the promise of social rise and 
wealth for everybody. However, should this promise 
ever be redeemed – what happens then?
What is to be done? The value of the aggregate as-
sets and, with them, of debts will have to be brought 
down to a level that can be mastered by the existing 
society, which does not consist only of top perform-
ers and Olympic athletes. Indeed, this necessary im-
plosion of assets developed for some time, starting 
with the collapse of international stock markets in au-
tumn 2008, and lasting until spring 2009. In order to 
counteract the collapse and to stabilise the markets, 
the governments intervened with voluminous par-
cels of credit, credit guarantees, subsidies and public 
expenditures. They exchanged “bad”, defaulted pri-
vate assets for “good” public bonds and thus tried to 
guarantee the profitability of private capital via tax 
money. This came down to the attempt to slow down 
the air leak of the bubble by pumping new air into 
it. As an immediate result, the downward movement 
indeed came to a halt, even more, share prices started 
to rise again and the investment banks are still paying 
high bonuses as if nothing had happened. It remains 
to be seen, however, how lasting the present stabilisa-
tion will be. Obviously, there is still a lot of air in the 
bubble, and the stabilisation may turn out to be only 
the prelude of a new, even deeper crisis. As a conse-
quence of exploding public debts, the governments 
themselves may become targeted by the financial 
markets and become the focus of the next turmoil, as 
the present Euro crisis indicates.
For developing a more sustainable strategy, it is 
recommended to go back to the earlier analyses of 
Keynes and search for ways how to prevent the build-
up of excessive financial assets from the outset by 
means of political regulation and intervention. The 
creation of speculative “products” by the financial in-
dustry should be curbed, investment and credit busi-
ness separated clearly from each other, the public sec-
tor ought to be strengthened and enlarged. In order 
to overcome the public debt problem, capital incomes 
and financial market transactions should be taxed ad-
equately and efficiently. In a global capitalist system, 
political interventions of such a kind need to be coor-
dinated internationally and cannot work on a purely 
national basis. If the rise of non-redeemable capital 
claims were counteracted from the beginning, the risk 
of subsequent bubbles and crashes could be reduced. 
Economic sociology can contribute to uncover the 
paradox structures of action on financial markets, and 
thus can help the actors to accept the inevitable and 
to overcome their narrow focus on private financial 
gain. 
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